United States
Authority enactedREPO Act (2024) enables seizure and transfer. Not implemented by Biden; status under Trump administration unclear as peace negotiations continue. REPO 2.0 introduced Sept. 2025 to mandate implementation.
A comprehensive briefing on the background, legal framework, key decisions, where jurisdictions stand, and what remains unresolved, for policymakers, journalists, academics, and researchers.
Russian sovereign assets are central-bank reserves and related state holdings: funds accumulated by the Russian government and held in foreign financial institutions. These are distinct from private Russian assets or oligarch wealth, which are subject to different legal rules and procedures.
Roughly €190 billion is held at Euroclear in Belgium. An additional €22 billion is held in France. The assets remain frozen but are not being used for reparations; current mechanisms generate approximately €3 billion annually in windfall profits, a fraction of what Ukraine needs.
Ukraine's total reconstruction needs are estimated at $588 billion and rising (World Bank, Feb. 2026). Even full repurposing of the frozen principal would not cover Ukraine's needs entirely, but it represents the single largest available source of reparations funding.
Amounts shown reflect direct holdings in each jurisdiction: assets held by the Central Bank of Russia in accounts or securities at institutions in that country. They do not include assets held through correspondent accounts or indirect custodial arrangements, which may substantially increase effective exposure in some jurisdictions. For a full breakdown, see the detailed breakdown by jurisdiction.
A growing body of international-law scholarship and state practice supports using Russia's frozen sovereign assets for Ukraine. The case rests on four main legal foundations.
Under ARSIWA art. 31(1) and UNGA Resolution ES-11/5, Russia bears a binding legal obligation to compensate Ukraine for the destruction it has caused.
The freezing of Russian assets is a lawful countermeasure under the law of state responsibility. Third-party states may take countermeasures in response to serious violations of jus cogens norms.
There is no material legal difference between holding assets indefinitely and transferring them outright. Both deprive Russia of access for the same duration and purpose; Russia cannot claim damages because it owes more than the frozen amount.
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (1990), the US, UK, and France transferred frozen Iraqi state assets to an international escrow account without Iraq's consent; the same framework: reparations obligation, claims commission, frozen assets as funding source.
Initial immobilisation of Russian sovereign assets
Within days of Russia's full-scale invasion, G7 nations and the EU froze approximately $300 billion in Russian central-bank reserves, the largest concentration (~€190 billion) held at Euroclear in Belgium.
Canada enacts asset-seizure authority
Canada became the first G7 country to legislate explicit authority to seize, forfeit, and redistribute sovereign assets under amendments to its Special Economic Measures Act.
UNGA Resolution ES-11/5: Russia must pay reparations
Adopted by 94 votes to 14, recognising Russia's legal obligation to pay reparations to Ukraine and calling for an international mechanism to register damages.
Register of Damage for Ukraine established
An international body to document evidence and claims for damage caused by Russia's aggression, forming the evidentiary foundation for future reparations proceedings.
EU windfall-profits mechanism established
The European Council required Euroclear and other depositories to segregate windfall profits; close to €5 billion was directed to Ukraine across 2024–25.
REPO Act signed into law
President Biden signed the REPO Act, authorising the executive to seize Russian sovereign assets and transfer them to Ukraine. Not implemented before Biden left office.
G7 finalises $50 billion ERA loan
The Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan: $50 billion to Ukraine serviced by future windfall profits from frozen Russian assets over ten years.
ECtHR holds Russia responsible for human-rights violations in Ukraine
The Grand Chamber unanimously held Russia responsible for widespread and systematic violations in eastern Ukraine since 2014.
European Commission proposes Reparations Loan
The Commission proposed using ~€210 billion in frozen Russian cash balances as the basis for a €90 billion loan, repayable only if Russia pays reparations. Shelved in favour of EU market borrowing.
EU enacts indefinite-immobilisation legislation
The Council enacted legislation under Article 122 TFEU indefinitely immobilising Russian state assets until Russia ends its war and pays reparations, removing any Member State's individual veto power.
International Claims Commission Convention signed
The EU and 35 countries signed the Convention establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine. Enters into force after 25 ratifications.
EUCO agrees €90 billion loan; Reparations Loan shelved
EU leaders agreed to a €90 billion loan through 2027 based on EU market borrowing. The Commission was tasked with continuing work on the Reparations Loan. No decision on the principal.
Canada's Bill C-15 receives Royal Assent
Including Division 18 amendments to SEMA requiring federal financial institutions to report on sanctioned property and profits in their possession.
Russia's Central Bank files suit before EU's General Court
Targeting the December 2025 indefinite-immobilisation regulation. For analysis of why the case is unlikely to succeed, see Addressing the Objections.
Canadian Bill S-214 passes committee
Bill S-214 to amend the Special Economic Measures Act (repurposing of foreign state assets) passes committee and moves to third reading.
No decision has been made on the use of the ~€210 billion in frozen principal in the EU, nor the remaining amounts in other jurisdictions. The €90 billion loan addresses Ukraine's immediate funding needs through 2027, but the windfall-profits mechanism generates only approximately €3 billion annually, insufficient to meet reconstruction needs or provide meaningful accountability.
REPO Act (2024) enables seizure and transfer. Not implemented by Biden; status under Trump administration unclear as peace negotiations continue. REPO 2.0 introduced Sept. 2025 to mandate implementation.
Largest holder (~€200B at Euroclear). Windfall profits in use; ERA loan operational; indefinite immobilisation enacted. Principal untouched; Reparations Loan under development.
Publicly supportive. Exploring specific legal tools; seeking alignment with G7 and EU rather than acting unilaterally.
First to legislate seizure (2022). Bill C-15 (2026) expanded SEMA powers; Bill S-214 currently at third reading moves from authority toward implementation.
Second-largest holder after Europe. Supports Ukraine but wary of financial-system implications. Open to collective G7 decisions.
Australia, Switzerland, and others engaged in legal and political debates. No decisive action beyond initial freezes.
Several interim steps are available to policymakers that would move toward resolution without requiring full agreement on outright transfer. Neither segregation nor moving assets to a trust alters ownership, so neither raises issues of seizure or confiscation.
Use prudential regulatory powers to transfer Russian assets and liabilities into a purpose-built entity managed by a consortium of willing EU governments, reducing systemic risk to Euroclear while preserving the freeze.
Move assets out of Euroclear and into a multinational compensation fund using EU Treaty powers already invoked for indefinite immobilisation: Articles 122(1), 212, and 215 TFEU.
The Council of Europe Convention establishing the International Claims Commission needs 25 ratifications to enter into force. Each ratification brings the formal compensation mechanism closer to operation.